

# EXPECTANCY THEORY EXPLAINING CIVIL SERVANTS' WORK MOTIVATION. EVIDENCE FROM A ROMANIAN CITY HALL

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## **Abstract**

*This research analyzes the work motivation of civil servants from Cluj-Napoca City Hall. Based on Victor Vroom's expectancy theory are analyzed the aspects related to the context of work and career of civil servants that influence their expectation, instrumentality and valences. The study is based on a quantitative research methodology. The results show that although there are positive influences, however, the level of work motivation is medium. The study is important for the management of local public institutions, public and private managers as well as other interested parties.*

**Key words:** work motivation, civil servants, expectancy theory, expectancy, instrumentality, valences

**JEL classification:** D23, M12, M54

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The importance of knowing ways to motivate civil servants and their implementation is one of the topical issues in terms of central and local public administration. Unfortunately, the legislation is deficient regarding the motivation of civil servants, so the issues pertaining to it are left to the leadership of public institutions and to public sector managers. As civil servants' interest in motivation has also increased lately, due to the fact that they feel that their work performance is not rewarded properly, there is a growing concern to improve the aspects related to motivation.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

In the public sector, motivation is often associated with high performance (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008). It is important to note that performance in public institutions differs from the one in companies. Within companies, individual performance is often seen in financial terms. In the public sector, performance is more about responsibility and equity in delivering public services. According to several studies in literature, the latest approaches to motivation refer to the term of public service motivation, which is a specific feature of the public sector and is specific to organizations and institutions in the public sector. A distinction must be made between work motivation as an employee in a certain work field, in our case the public administration, with its specific features and public service motivation.

Public service motivation (Brewer & Selden, 1998) takes different forms depending on the public institution (Rainey, 1997) and is defined as the motivational force that induces individuals to undertake meaningful, public, community or social service emphasizing the behavioral implications and their applicability beyond the public sector. Studies (Giauque et al., 2008) have shown that individuals choose a job in the public sector, according to particular criteria corresponding to intrinsic elements such as: the desire to work for the general interest, the personal interest in the realization of a public policy, community work having a greater sense of accomplishment than the one of the private sector employees (Crewson, 1997). The theme addressed in the present research does not refer to civil service motivation but to work motivation, defined as the whole of the management processes (Androniceanu, 2008), through which he, the public manager, manages to determine the civil servants to participate in achieving goals using a diverse tool to make them interested.

### 3. EXPECTANCY THEORY

The basic idea of the expectation theory elaborated by Vroom or the VIE model is that people choose to act in a hedonistic manner (Vroom, 1964), having preference for the actions that will bring them the greatest expected subjective utility. According to the VIE model, motivational force depends on the expectation that the effort will produce performance, the instrumentality that performance will lead to rewards and the value attributed to rewards. The first two variables are inversely proportional to the difficulty of fulfilling the task. Consequently, the theory implies a negative relationship between the difficulty of the task to be fulfilled and the motivation to achieve the task (Klein, 1990). The lack of any element of the relationship will lead to lack of motivation.

$$M = E \times I \times V$$

where:  $M$ - motivation;  $E$ -expectancy;  $I$ -instrumentality;  $V$ -valence

Mathematically, in a more developed form, this theory can be expressed as bellow:

$$E = A \times \left( \sum_{j=1}^n I_{ij} \times V_j \right)$$

Where:  $E$  is the effort/ the intensity of effort/ the motivational force

$A$  is the expectancy that effort will lead to performance

$I_{ij}$  is the instrumentality of performance  $i$  to obtain a second level result  $j$

$V_j$  is the valence of the second level result

$n$  is the number of second level results

#### Expectancy

Expectation is the expectation in relation to the individual effort that needs to be made, in other words, the chances of success attributed to one's own capacities in order to achieve performance. Employees are generally motivated to get seriously work involved if they come to believe that the efforts they make will be reflected in high performance.

Expectancy depends on: the clarity of performance goals; self-esteem (Gaignard, 2003); the esteem/ confidence given by others; skills / skills of the employee, experience, knowledge, etc.; the support an employee can obtain from colleagues or superiors; the resources at its disposal (appropriate equipment, relevant information, materials, time). The organization / institution can influence the expectation of an individual if it does not provide the necessary resources to carry out a task. The expectation is subjectively perceived, even if it refers to objective elements. If the employee has the resources needed to make the effort but he does not feel fit for the task, the expectation will be reduced.

The elements (Eraly, 2009), through which the organization/institution can influence expectation are:

- organization of work to the extent that it allows gradual learning, skills development, etc.;
- delegation of power;
- training policy;
- internal mobility, as it allows employees to gain experience, acquire new skills, etc.
- the attitude of superiors as it can affect self-esteem;
- coaching as a form of supervision but pursuing the development of people in various forms.

#### Instrumentality

The most studied factor of the VIE model is instrumentality and it was the most confirmed factor of both practical and theoretical experiments. Instrumentality is the probability perceived by an individual as an effort to be or not accompanied by a reward. For example, people work much faster if they get financial rewards, or if they think the way they do their work affects their opportunities for promotion.

The level of instrumentality can be determined by answering the question: *What do I gain?*

As in the case of expectation, instrumentality can be both subjective and objective. Instrumentality is objective because of elements of the working environment like: the system of appreciation, remuneration, and promotion. It may be subjective to the extent that individuals are not properly informed about the items mentioned, and tend to be optimistic or pessimistic about them. Instrumentality must also be associated with the notion of equity, since instrumentality is often perceived by a social comparison with other individuals.

Employees' instrumentality can be influenced through:

- promotion policy;
- appreciation system;
- payroll policy;
- the attitude of superiors;
- the meritocracy elements;
- the information given to employees on the elements outlined above;
- the information degree of veracity.

### **Valence**

Valence is the subjective value, attachment or preference that each individual attributes to a reward. It does not exist as such, but only in relation to a certain result: wage increase, promotion, transfer to a new job, more responsibility at work, etc. It is not enough that rewards are correctly perceived, but the individual to really want to get them (to be meaningful for him). Valences can be positive (pay, promotions, interesting tasks, etc.) or negative (reprimands, sanctions, transfers, etc.). The level of valence can be determined by answering the questions: *Am I interested?* And *Is it important to me?*

The organization / institution may influence valences by the type of rewards offered and their capitalization with the help of:

- negative valences (sanctions, penalties, redundancies, etc.);
- extrinsic valences (pay policy, promotion, etc.)
- intrinsic valences (interest in work, etc.).

For motivation to work as a process, these three parameters must work together, because if one of the factors is missing or is null, the motivation as a whole will be null. At the same time, low values of the three elements will lead to low motivation.

Numerous studies support Vroom's theory: (Glabarith & Cumings, Georgopoulos, Mahoney & Jones, Graen, Lawler, Porler, Vroom and Deci, etc.) and correlate the three independent variables positively. The model predicts the effort because it is controllable, unlike performance even when expectancy and instrumentality are reported to itself (Landy & Trumbo, 1983). Looking at them subjectively, expectancy and instrumentality can relate to effort not because they cause it, but rather because it represents the rationalization of decision after making the effort. VIE theory implies hedonism, rationality (Behling et al., 1974; Locke, 1968), noncoliniarity (Behling & Starke, 1973) and an uncertain measure of validity in construction (Miner, 1980). The main limits of the VIE model refer to its tendency to be idealistic, to the difficulty of operating the concepts and the limited approach.

## **4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

In order to understand the hypotheses that underpin the empirical research, some remarks must be made, as they were expressed by prof. Eraly (Eraly, 2009), on the VIE model developed by Victor Vroom:

- if any of the model's factors are null, the motivation will be null;
- the model applies to a particular action, the motivation of doing something (in our case-work motivation) and does not refer to motivation in general;
- the rationality of the model is limited by the fact that expectancy and instrumentality are representations and not realities and that valences are susceptible to contingent planning;

- this model can be the basis of a diagnostic analysis of an organization by finding answers to several questions:
  - *Is the level of expectation sufficient? How can it be strengthened?*
  - *Is instrumentality sufficient?*
  - *How are valences built? Aren't there too many negative or extrinsic valences?*

Therefore the main objective of this research is a diagnostic analysis of the Cluj-Napoca City Hall on how certain aspects of the work and career of civil servants influence their work motivation. We have, in fact, sought, among other things, to find the answers to the questions outlined above, and to explain the results. In other words, we have sought to highlight the level of expectancy, the instrumentality and analyze valences, and then measure the overall level of work motivation, and explain it on the basis of the results obtained for each element of the VIE model.

The hypotheses underlying the research are the following:

*Hypothesis 1. The civil servants from Cluj –Napoca city hall have a high level of expectancy.*

*Hypothesis 2. The civil servants from Cluj –Napoca city hall have a high level of instrumentality.*

*Hypothesis 3. The existing types of valences positively influence work motivation.*

*Hypothesis 4. The civil servants from Cluj –Napoca city hall have a high work motivation.*

### **Research instrument**

The study is based on a quantitative research conducted through an omnibus questionnaire. The questions were made taking into account the legislative provisions regarding the career and the activity of public servants such as The Statute of civil servants. The questionnaire was structured in ten sections: the internship period, the promotion, professional training/assessment, professional performance assessment, mobility, reward/pay, sanctions, career in local public administration, working environment and motivation for work. In order to avoid the redundancy of the information, the questions in the questionnaire have been transformed into variables (keeping the exact name) in the analysis of responses, as they will be presented in the empirical part of the study while below are presented the reasons behind their application.

### **Expectancy analysis**

In order to measure the level of expectation, it was taken into account in the questionnaire the above mentioned elements regarding the elements by which an institution / organization can influence the expectation level. For this study, it were considered the following: debutant civil servants probation period, training, mobility and performance evaluation.

*The debutant civil servants probation period* helps civil servants to accumulate knowledge, become familiar with tasks, job duties, work environment and also verifies their professional skills. As a result it can influence their perception of their own person, their skills, the self-esteem in their work. This is only the case if: the civil servants go through such a period; the purpose of the probation period is actually achieved in reality and civil servants consider that the period of the internship was a useful one for the afterwards work.

*Trainings* are designed to help the individual acquire new knowledge and skills and build confidence in its own forces to make the effort necessary to achieve performance (in our case, to work) . The above are achieved if: there are organized training and civil servants participate; access to trainings is easy and allowed to all categories of civil servants; civil servants participate in courses; courses have practical applicability and are useful in everyday work.

The various forms of *mobility* in local public institutions or between them also influence the level of expectation. Civil servants have the opportunity to gain new knowledge through the possibility of mobility. This may be the movement to another department of the institution, practical training in other public authorities or institutions (relevant in terms of the specific nature of the activity) or the temporary movement to another department of the public authority or institution in order to develop the knowledge, skills and competencies of civil servants. All these influence the perception of individual's ability to make the effort, and consequently his expectation, only if: the forms of mobility are allowed and accessible to all categories of civil servants; civil servants

consider them useful; there is no difficulty in obtaining a form of mobility; politics does not influence the possibility of mobility.

*Professional performance evaluations* can also influence self-esteem and self-perception of making the effort. A positive evaluation will have a positive influence on the civil servant, while a negative one may have a positive or negative influence, as the case may be. The evaluation of professional performance influences expectancy if: assessments are made and they comply with the provisions of the law on the range and procedures; for civil servants it is important to be evaluated; positive and negative evaluations influence the attitude of the civil servant in their work.

### **Measuring instrumentality**

In order to measure instrumentality, based on the above-mentioned theory, the following aspects were taken into consideration as they could influence instrumentality: promotions, reward / payment systems, working environment and performance evaluation. On a practical level, it is difficult to clearly identify the aspects that are strictly related to one or the other elements of the VIE model, due to their complexity and especially because some of them can influence more elements depending on the angle they are observed.

It is also the case of *promotion*, which influences both instrumentality and is perceived as a valence. In the case of instrumentality promotions are seen as a means to achieve other results such as: rewards, esteem, etc. In the applied questionnaire one has tried to see if in the case of promotion there are differences between the legislation and reality, because (if analyzed as instrumentality) its level is influenced by rules application. Instrumentality can also be influenced by the *sense of equity* perceived by employees.

At the same time, it was also analyzed the influence of the *political factor* on promotions as instrumental in obtaining them. Regarding the *reward /payment system*, one also wanted to highlight the perceived equity. Let's not forget the *appreciation of work* and the *rewards forms*, which also influence instrumentality. For example, getting a bonus can be instrumental in raising the esteem that colleagues and superiors have regarding the employee. As with promotion, some aspects regarding the rewarding system may also influence valences. Also, the *attitude of the superiors* is seen as a factor of influence over instrumentality.

### **Valence analysis**

Through the applied questionnaire, we sought to discover how, at the level of a local public institution, valences are influenced by the type of rewards offered, their capitalization, etc. So issues regarding promotions, performance evaluation, sanctions and rewards were analyzed.

As mentioned above, *promotions* can influence both instrumentality and valences. In the case of valence, the intention to obtain a promotion may be an end itself and not the means of achieving other results. The importance given to *performance evaluation* by the public institution also influences valences, positively (through positive evaluations) or negative (through negative evaluations).

*Sanctions* may act as negative valences, so the questionnaire also included questions about how sanctions are applied at the level of the city hall. Since *rewards* are considered extrinsic valences, civil servants were also asked questions about them.

### **Work motivation analysis**

To determine the level of work motivation (the left side of the VIE model), the questionnaire has also comprised several questions that directly measure the degree of motivation. They try to explain the result of work motivation level by explaining the factors that influence it.

The *analysis methodology* included inferential statistical techniques and multidimensional data analysis. In addition to the quantitative and qualitative used variables, the ordinal variables were used in the questionnaire. They were constructed either as simple ordinal variables or as Likert items, with a scale of 0 to 5 (I do not respond, I do not know, Not at all, In a small measure, In a high measure, In a very high measure). In order to obtain as accurate answers as possible, the

respondents were given the possibility to refrain from answering by choosing the answer 'I am not answering' or 'I do not know'.

Survey data were input into SPSS v.17 for Windows and descriptive statistics analysis (mode value, the Chi-Square Test and Kendall's Rank Correlation Coefficient) were used.

### The studied population

Following the approval from the Cluj-Napoca City Hall to distribute the questionnaires to civil servants, the initial sample was randomly constructed. Thus, from each office were randomly selected civil servants to participate in our study. A sample of 150 civil servants was build. 115 questionnaires were returned, resulting in a response rate of 76%. Due to the large number of non-responses, the final sample analyzed has the volume of 96 civil servants. The survey was conducted in 2011.

#### *Demographic characteristics of respondents*

From the civil servants who responded to our questionnaire 34.7% were aged between 36-45 years. More than half (54.26%), of respondents are women and over 80% of respondents have at least university studies. 43.16% have a seniority in the local public administration ranging from 5 to 14 years, and over 90% have a public execution function.

## 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

### The results regarding expectancy

#### *The debutant civil servants probation period*

Of the civil servants who responded if they had a period of internship as debutants, only a quarter confirm the passage of such a period, the general opinion of the respondents being that not all civil servants are trained before the nomination. Although in theory the purpose of the internship is the practical form of debuting public servants and to check their professional skills, the reality differs, fact confirmed by over half of the respondents (67.49%). Approximately one-third of respondents (30.43%) consider the period of training as a formal one. It is interesting to note that almost a third of the respondents did not express their opinion, choosing not to respond, and almost 20% of them said they did not know the answer to the question. Regarding the probation period and its importance in determining the influence on expectation, the most representative question one considered to be the one about its usefulness for later work. Only 38.4% of respondents considered the internship to be useful for their work afterwards.

We wanted to see what kind of links exist between this variable and those through which it is possible to explain the results obtained. Thus, it was observed that between the variables *The internship was useful for the work afterwards* and *Each civil servant follows a probation period before appointment*, there is a link (sig = 0.000 < 0.05) and this is direct and medium intensity (the coefficient of Kendall's correlation is 0.554). For space reasons, it is shown only the first graphically statistical result, for the rest of them are presented below only the numbers.

**Table 1. The link between the variables: *The internship was useful for the work afterwards* and *Each civil servant follows a probation period before appointment***

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	99.653 <sup>a</sup>	25	.000
Likelihood Ratio	81.207	25	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	39.358	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	92		

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a. 32 cells (88.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .43.

## Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error <sup>a</sup>	Approx. T <sup>b</sup>	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	.721			.000
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's tau-b	.554	.061	8.475	.000
N of Valid Cases		92			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

In other words, the usefulness of the probation period can be explained, among other things, by the fact that each civil servant has been through such a period and thus has had the opportunity to learn new things useful for his work. If this probation period was not compulsory, only a few of the civil servants (those interested) would be able to acquire new knowledge and test their skills.

The contradiction comes from the fact that most of the respondents believe that not all debutant civil servants go through such a period. Regarding the usefulness of the internship, about the same over 40% of respondents consider the probation period being useless. This makes us believe that a significant proportion of respondents (over 40%) did not go through such a period, and as a result they are the same civil servants who have also responded negatively to the question about the usefulness of the internship, while those who have considered the probation period as indeed a useful period, have been those who have gone through such a period. Another explanation may also be related to the honesty of the answers received, which raises some questions, due to the above mentioned elements. Between the variables *The probation period was useful for the work afterwards* and *The purpose of the probation period is to practically form the debutant civil servants and to verify their skills, but the reality is different*, there is a direct link (sig = 0.000 < 0.05) but of poor intensity (Kendall Correlation coefficient of 0.077). In other words, the usefulness of the probation period for most respondents cannot be explained by the fact that the purpose of the internship is not verified. This is contradictory. In reality, civil servants do not accumulate new knowledge and their skills are not verified, but yet most of them claim that this period has been useful to them. In our opinion either the respondents did not show honesty in their answers, or it is confirmed that the probation period was useful only to those who have followed such a period, but not the case of the majority.

The fact that most respondents consider that the probation period was not a difficult period (43% of respondents) has also influenced the link with its usefulness. The sig value = 0.000 < 0.05, shows a link between the variables *The probation period was useful for the work afterwards* and *The probation period was a difficult one*. Kendall's correlation coefficient is 0.504, resulting in a direct average intensity relationship between the two variables. It is interesting to note that although most of the respondents claim that the probation period is a formal one they state that the probation period was useful. Sig = 0.000 < 0.05 therefore there is a link between the variables *The probation period was useful for the work afterwards* and *The probation period is a formal one*. Kendall's correlation coefficient is 0.121, i.e., there is a link of weak intensity. This makes us believe that the period of the internship was not useful for the afterwards work, precisely because it is formal and does not help in acquiring new knowledge or skills.


We wanted to verify this hypothesis by measuring the link between the variables *The purpose of the probation period is to practically form the debutant civil servants and to check their professional skills, but the reality is different* and *The probation period is a formal one*. Sig = 0.000 < 0.05, so there is a link between the variables, and it is of medium intensity (Kendall's correlation coefficient is 0.35).

This means that the probation period is indeed a formal one, which in reality does not achieve its purpose.

As noticed, the conditions outlined above, in order for the probation period to contribute to the expectation of civil servants, are not respected. Only a few of civil servants go through such a period and are the same ones as the ones who find it useful for their work afterwards. Most respondents consider the probation period as a formal one, and its real purpose in practice is reached in very few cases. In other words, the probation period negatively influences the expectancy by *reducing* its level.

### Trainings

In the case of training, most of the respondents (80%) have participated to at least one training (course). With regard to the access to trainings, opinions are divided. Approximately the same proportion of respondents (38.95%) consider it easy to access training courses, as the ones who have stated the contrary (37.9%).



**Figure 1. Civil servants answers**

Source: own calculation in SPSS

The majority of respondents (43.15%) believe that not all civil servants are attending such courses, but almost all civil servants surveyed (77.89%) consider motivating to participate in trainings.

One third of respondents (31.58%) consider attending trainings as mandatory in order to get promoted, while about half of them (48.42%) disagree. More than half of the respondents (58.95%) consider the content of the training and professional courses as having practical applicability in their work.

A significant proportion of respondents (67.02%) consider the courses they have taken as useful for their work. Among the variables *The trainings were useful to me in my daily work* and *I think that if I did not attend trainings my work capacity would be affected*, there is a direct link of average intensity (Sig = 0.000 < 0.05; k = 0.411). As a result, the respondents consider that non-participation in trainings/professional courses would affect their working ability.

Between the variables *I have attended at least one training / professional course* and *In the institution where I work is mandatory to attend trainings in order to advance in my career* there is no link (Sig = 0.94 > 0.05). Therefore, it cannot be said that the reason civil servants go to such courses is to advance in their career.



What emerges from our analysis is the fact that most of those who follow these courses do so by their own will (between the variables *I have attended at least one training /professional course* and *For me is motivating to go to trainings* is a direct link of average intensity (Sig = 0.000 <0.05; k = 0.454).

An important aspect to be taken into account is the link between the variables *The courses I have taken have been useful to me in my daily work* and *What is learned in these courses has a practical applicability*. Sig = 0.000 < 0.05; k = 0.454, so there is a direct average intensity link between the two variables. In other words, the usefulness of courses followed is due to the practical applicability they have. Between the variables *The courses I have taken have been useful to me in my daily work* and *The access to trainings/ professional courses is difficult* there is a small intensity link (sig = 0.049 <0.05, k = -0.013) which confirms once again that access to trainings is not difficult.

As a result of these results, the issues related to the *trainings* contribute to the *growth* of civil servants expectancy, as the necessary conditions, mentioned earlier, are fulfilled.

### **Mobility**

In the case of mobility, the mode value is 4, which means that most respondents consider the possibility of mobility to be of great importance. Between the variables *I believe the possibility of mobility is important* and *In the institution I work mobility forms are frequent* there is a direct and low intensity link (sig=0.000 < 0.05; k=0.235). Almost 34% of respondents consider that transfers / relocations are seen negatively in the institution where they work, while almost 40% consider it is not the case or it happens in a small extent. However, the mode value is 1, meaning most respondents do not know the answer to the question.

Between the variables *In the institution I work mobility forms are frequent* and *I believe that transfers/movements in the institution I work are negatively seen* there is a direct weak intensity link (Sig=0.000 < 0.05; k=0.285) meaning that even though mobility forms are frequent not all of them are seen in a negative way.

The link between the variables *In the institution I work mobility forms are frequent* and *I believe that most of the mobility forms apply in the case of civil servants that do not work very well* has a weak intensity ( sig=0.000 < 0.05 ; k=0.201). This means mobility forms are frequent but do not necessarily apply to civil servants that do not do their work very well. Over half of the respondents say they did not go through any mobility form.

Only 9% of respondents find it easy to get a transfer, while over 30% of them feel they would not have approved a transfer / movement request. The relationship between the two variables is direct of average intensity (sig = 0.000 <0.05; k = 0.570), which confirms that access to mobility is not easy.

Approximately one third of respondents (38.95%) claim that politics has an influence on mobility.

Although it is relatively easy to get a form of mobility, they are often influenced by political factors (sig = 0.001 <0.05; k = 0.272). As a result of the above, it can be noticed that in the case of *mobility*, the influence exerted on expectancy is *negative* in the sense of reducing the latter. Several conditions required for a high level of expectation are not met.

### **Evaluation of professional performance**

According to the majority of respondents (71.58%), they are annually evaluated, according to the law, and for half of them (55.79%) it is important to be evaluated. A positive evaluation motivates more than half (65.26%) of the respondent civil servants to work better, while a negative one (50.53%) demotivates only half of them. The explanation is that not always criticism is perceived as a negative thing, but on the contrary, some civil servants appreciate when they are drawn to mistakes in order to correct them.

As a consequence, the *evaluation* in our case contributes to increasing the expectancy of civil servants in a positive way, contributing to its growth.

From the aspects presented until this point now, one can speak of a **moderate level of expectation** of civil servants from the Cluj-Napoca City Hall. This is due to the unfavorable influence of probation period and mobility issues. However, it is worth noting that both training and evaluation positively influence the expectation.

### **The results regarding instrumentality**

#### ***Promotion***

An important part of the respondents (62.77%) believe that in practice, in the city hall where they work, there are differences in legal regulations regarding promotion. Most respondents think that this is happening in a very high measure (the mode value is 5). Also, most respondents consider promotions are not fairly made in their institution (mode value 3).

The link between variables *In the institution I work there are differences between regulations and practice regarding promotions* and *I believe promotions are fair in the institution I work* is direct of a weak intensity ( $\text{sig}=0.000 < 0.05$ ;  $k=0.150$ ). It results that promotions are not perceived as fair due to differences between regulations and practice.

Most respondents consider that promotions are influenced by the political factor in a very high measure (the mode value is 5). As a result the perception of promotions fairness is also influenced by the fact that they are affected by the political factor ( $\text{sig} = 0.001 < 0.05$ ,  $k = 0.017$ ), resulting in a weak intensity link between the variables *I believe promotions are fair in the institution I work* and *I believe promotions are influenced by politics*.

As a consequence, *promotion* aspects influence the level of instrumentality in a *negative* way, in the sense of reducing its level.

#### ***The reward /payment system***

With a mode value of 2, the majority of respondents to this question believe that the remuneration of civil servants in their institution is not correct. Almost 80% of respondents claim that their work is usually rewarded only by money. However, over half of respondents (59.58%) consider motivating to be rewarded by greetings regarding the way they do their job. However, there is no connection between the two variables ( $\text{sig} = 0.561$ ), which in fact indicates the existence of only one form of reward, namely money. Most civil servants (85.26%) believe that the existence of a performance-based rewarding system would be motivating. The difficulty of such an action is to define performance, when almost half of respondents believe that if they were paid better they would work even more (52.63%) and better (54.74%). It is practically an increase in the effort both quantitatively and qualitatively. Consequently, *the reward/ payment system* has a *negative influence on instrumentality*, as civil servants do not perceive a sense of fairness about rewards, and consider other forms of appreciation of their work to be motivating (eg recognition of merit by thanks for the work done, the existence of a prime system based on performance).

#### ***Sense of equity***

Most respondents (66.32%) claim that they have rarely felt to be disadvantaged compared to other colleagues. The weak intensity link between the variables *I often feel disadvantaged compared to other colleagues* and *It is motivating to have a good service relationship with my colleagues* ( $\text{sig} = 0.001 < 0.05$ ,  $k = 0.099$ ) indicates that the respondents have a good working relationship with their colleagues and this helps to perceive the sense of fairness between them. Also, the weak intensity link ( $\text{sig} = 0.001 < 0.05$ ,  $k = 0.284$ ) existing between the variables *I often feel disadvantaged compared to other colleagues* and *This fact has influenced my work motivation* indicates that most of the respondents do not feel disadvantaged in relation to their colleagues and as a result their work motivation is not influenced by this. As a result, the fact that employees perceive a *sense of equity* in relation to other colleagues *positively* influences instrumentality in the sense of increasing its level.

### ***Superior's attitude/Evaluations***

The attitude of the superiors is considered to be another factor of influence on instrumentality. Most respondents claim that they feel unofficially evaluated by superiors (the mode value is 3), but almost all respondents (89.48%) consider it important to be able to discuss with their superiors about their work, without considering demotivating the remarks made by their superiors.

Although the majority of respondents (97.87%) consider important to have a good working relationship with their direct superior, and also the majority (63.15%) of civil servants often discuss issues related to work with them, the fact that there is no link between the two variables ( $\text{sig} = 0.146 > 0.05$ ) leads us to believe that there is no motivation for respondents to have a good service relationship with their immediate superior to discuss the issues of their work. Hence it results, for example, that a good working relationship with superiors helps in other ways, such as promotions. Because between the variables *I often discuss with my supervisor about my work* and *I often feel unofficially evaluated by my superior*, there is no link ( $\text{sig} = 0.123 > 0.05$ ), it means that due to the fact that the civil servants often discuss with their superiors about their work, they do not think they are unofficially evaluated by superiors, either positive or negative.

Between variables *I often discuss with my supervisor about my work* and *For me is important to be able to discuss with my superiors about my work* there is a direct link of medium intensity ( $\text{sig}=0.000 < 0.05$ ;  $k=0.469$ ), which once again confirms the importance civil servants give to the possibility of discussing work related issues with superiors.

The fact that between variables *I often discuss with my supervisor about my work* and *If my superiors make observations about my work it demotivates me* there is no link ( $\text{sig}=0.206 > 0.05$ ) also confirms the above mentioned referring the positive perception of employees over the observations received from their superiors.

In consequence *superiors attitude* influence *positively* the instrumentality of civil servants from the city hall of Cluj-Napoca.

As in the case of expectancy it can be observed a **medium level of instrumentality**. Civil servants perceive an equity between them and their colleagues and also the attitude of their superiors is also positive (both positively influencing instrumentality) the others aspects related promotion and rewards influence instrumentality in a *negative* way.

### **Results regarding valences**

#### ***Promotion as valence***

At institution level, promotion is seen as very important for over half of respondents being perceived by them as a valence. However, almost one-third of respondents do not consider promotion as very important. This may be due to personal reasons (valences being probably the most subjective elements of the VIE model) or other causes.

One of these may be that in practice there are differences compared to legislation in terms of promotions as between the two variables there is a direct link of weak intensity ( $\text{sig} = 0.023 < 0.05$ ;  $k = 0.026$ ). Another explanation may be related to the perception over the fairness of promotions. The absence of a link between the variables *For me is very important to be promoted* and *I think promotions are correct in the institution where I work* ( $\text{sig} = 0.090 > 0.05$ ) confirms that promotions are not considered important because they are not perceived as correct. In other words, the function is not important but the person.

With  $\text{sig}=0.065 > 0.05$  it can be observed that neither between the variables *For me is very important to be promoted* and *Promotions are influenced by politics* there is no link.

This means that politics intervention is another cause for which some respondents do not consider important promotions. As a result, they do not consider them relevant to characterize a person's work, but often perceive them as subjective.

Overall, however, *promotions are perceived as valences* by the respondents, thereby positively influencing work motivation.

### ***Evaluations as valences***

Most of those questioned claim that it is important for them to be evaluated. Interpreted as a valence, evaluations help them to know whether or if their work has been well done, and at the same time helping them know where they are in relation to their colleagues. We must not forget, however, that for career advancement there are also taken into account the performance evaluation, one more reason for which civil servants give a special attention to it.

The weak intensity link ( $\text{sig}=0.032 < 0.05$ ,  $k=0.103$ ) between the variables *For me is important to be evaluated* and *In the institution I work I have been annually evaluated* makes us believe that from the almost 90% of respondents who state they have been annually evaluated inly half of them consider evaluation important. This is also confirmed by the fact that half of respondents believe that the lack of evaluation does not influence their work motivation.

Also the average intensity link ( $\text{sig} = 0.000 < 0.05$ ,  $k = 0.493$ ) between the variables *For me is important to be evaluated* and *If I am not evaluated, my work motivation is affected* demonstrates the same thing.

For most of the civil servants questioned, a positive evaluation motivates them to work better (the mode value is 4), while roughly the same proportion considers that a negative evaluation demotivates them in a very high measure (the mode value is 5).

What draws attention is the fact that between variables *For me is important to be evaluated* and *A positive evaluation motivates me to do my work better* there is a medium intensity link ( $\text{sig}=0.000 < 0.05$ ,  $k=0.389$ ) while between variables *For me is important to be evaluated* and *A negative evaluation demotivates me* there is no link ( $\text{sig}=0.061 > 0.05$ ).

Hence, as long as evaluations are positive, respondents consider them important. In the case of negative evaluations they consider them to be demotivating and less important. This can be explained by the fact that negative evaluations affect not only self-esteem but also the perception of others (colleagues, bosses) on their own person.

From what has been shown so far, it appears that *evaluations* are perceived as *valences* only to the extent they are positive, thus affecting *work motivation* in a *negative* way.

### ***Sanctions as valences***

In the case of sanctions, almost all respondents are aware of the possibility of being sanctioned in the institution in which they work, but only half of them feel that sanctions apply frequently in their institution. Of the respondents, only 4% were sanctioned, most of them considering that sanctions only apply in the case to serious deeds (the mode value is 4).

Sanctions are not the reason why employees work well, as very few of them claim they have been sanctioned. There is a weak intensity link between the two variables ( $\text{sig} = 0.000 < 0.05$ ,  $k = 0.163$ ). Thus, the responding civil servants are not afraid of sanctions, as most of them have not been sanctioned. In conclusion, they are performing a quality job or simply the deviations were not serious enough to require sanctions.

One wanted to see to what extent some forms of mobility are considered as a form of sanction. The average intensity link ( $\text{sig} = 0.000 < 0.05$ ,  $k = 0.470$ ) between variables *I think the transfer/ movement in the institution where I work is badly seen* and *I think most forms of mobility apply especially to employees who do not do their work well* confirms that it is not the case. Mobility forms are not seen as sanctions and as a result are not viewed in a negative way.

In conclusion, as far as *sanctions* are concerned, they are negative valences for the respondents, but this is a normal fact. By being sanctioned, employees are more conscientious in their work. This is a positive thing, especially since sanctions are not exaggerated to have too many negative valences. As a result, it *positively influence work motivation*.

### ***Rewards***

As we mentioned in the theoretical part, rewards may be interpreted as valences. More than 70% of respondents are motivated by the thanks received for the way they do their work while for

over 80% of them remuneration contributes to work motivation, so it follows that both material rewards (salary, bonuses, bonuses, etc.) and the non-material ones (thanks, appreciation of work, gratitude) are valences for most respondents. As a result, they *positively influence work motivation*.

### Results regarding work motivation

Only half (51.57%) of the responding civil servants feel motivated in the work they do (the mode value is 4).

Most respondents consider that they are motivated to a large or very large extent by the fact that they have a stable job (74.74%) and that they have autonomy in the decision-making related to their work (74.2%). Among the variables *Generally, I feel motivated in my work* and *It motivates me to have a stable job* there is a direct link of low intensity (sig = 0.000 < 0.05, k = 0.258) and of medium intensity (sig = 0.000 < 0.05, k = 0.31) between variables *Generally, I feel motivated in my work* and *It motivates me to have autonomy in making decisions about my work*.

The majority (71.28%) of respondents are motivated if their skills, aptitudes and merits are appreciated and recognized and, respectively, have creative and non-repetitive tasks (79.95% of respondents).

However, within their institution the reality is different. The value of sig = 0.122 > 0.05 shows that among the variables *Generally, I feel motivated in my work* and *It motivates me that my abilities, skills and merits are appreciated and recognized* there is no link, which means, in our opinion, that respondents do not feel appreciated at workplace.

The same situation is found in the case of variables *In general, I feel motivated in the work I do* and *It motivates me a job where the tasks are creative and not repetitive*, of which there is also no connection (sig = 0.184 > 0.05). We believe hypothetically that respondents would be motivated by creative tasks but that this is not the case.

Another factor that contributes to work motivation is the working environment (office design). This is motivating for just a little over half of the respondents (57.9%), the weak link (sig = 0.000 < 0.05, k = 0.21) between the variables *Generally, I feel motivated in my work* and *The working environment motivates me in my work* we consider that in reality shows the fact that the arrangement of the office is pleased by the majority of the respondents.

However, almost half of those surveyed do not consider this factor to be motivating. This may be due to the fact that most of the time, civil servants operate in restricted spaces, having to share an office to a minimum of five people. Also, due to the lack of storage space their offices often turn into archives for the large number of existing files.

In addition to the factors that influence work motivation we must not forget about the *remuneration* that contributes to the motivation for work to a great extent for almost 80% of the respondents.

Overall, from the answers analysis of questions regarding work motivation, it was found an **average level of work motivation** work due to issues related to job stability, autonomy in decision-making and most times the office display.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion to the research, we will return to the hypotheses formulated before.

Thus *Hypothesis 1. The civil servants from Cluj –Napoca city hall have a high level of expectancy* is not verified, because after the analysis the resultant level of expectancy is medium.

*Hypothesis 2. The civil servants from Cluj –Napoca city hall have a high level of instrumentality* also it is not confirmed since the instrumentality level is medium.

*Hypothesis 3. The existing types of valences positively influence work motivation* is the only one confirmed by data.

Both positive and negative valences positively influence work motivation. Regarding work motivation reflected by *Hypothesis 4. The civil servants from Cluj –Napoca city hall have a high work motivation it results a medium level*, thus neither this hypothesis is confirmed.

Based on Vroom's expectancy theory, the high level of model elements (expectancy, instrumentality, and valence) would result in a high level of work motivation. As a result, it is natural that, as the obtained results show, an average level of two elements (expectancy and instrumentality) leads to an average level of work motivation, even if at the level of valences its was registered a positive influence.

Although the results are not among the best, we consider that there are many ways in which the three elements of the VIE model and the work motivation can be increased.

In the *expectancy* case the following actions could be taken:

- the institution management should ensure that all debutant civil servants go through a probation period;
- exerting pressure on internship tutors to closely observe the work of trainees to ensure the accumulation of practical skills and to check them;
- the presentation of job duties, the ways of their fulfillment, as well as the possible difficulties that can be encountered, so that civil servants would consider this period to be useful at the end of the probation period;
- the access to trainings should be easy for all categories of civil servants;
- facilitating access to forms of mobility by reducing bureaucracy, political influence, etc;
- finding ways for evaluations to reflect a true image of civil servants performance.

In order to increase *instrumentality* level we believe necessary the following aspects:

- complying in practice with the legal regulations on promotion, which will, among other things, result in a change in the perception of the fairness of the promotions;
- eliminating the influence of politics on promotions (one of the methods could be to ban the disclosure of "political preferences" among employees, although in practice such an action is very difficult);
- setting up a performance-based bonus system, in which case the discussion relates to performance in public administration, how it can be defined and measured - difficult to achieve, and the subject of many controversies;
- appreciation of employees work by other means than money (thanks, free days / hours, etc.). An example would be to give the title of "employee of the month", as is often the case in western countries and the US, which helps motivating employees.

Even if the research revealed a positive influence of valences on work motivation, the following measures could also be considered to create more valences:

- changing some aspects regarding evaluations so that the negative ones would be perceived as valences;
- superiors should realize the importance of rewards (both material and nonmaterial) as valences and should try to offer them in as many different forms.

In the case of *work motivation*, we consider that in order to achieve a high level of motivation, more efforts should be made on tasks creativity (which is hard to achieve, because public administration is an area that does not allow too much creativity, often being repetitive and influenced by bureaucracy) as well as on the recognition of employees' merits.

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